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INTRODUCTION
Oil is an everyday part of American life, but puzzlingly, the colossal
network of pipelines used for its transport is not. The United States hosts
the largest network of energy pipelines in the world with over 2.4 million
miles of pipe. However, that network is largely unseen, as much of it is
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330 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. VIII
buried beneath the ground.1 This extensive network is necessary because
Louisiana’s per capita energy consumption ranks among the highest in the
nation, second only to Texas.2 Additionally, Louisiana is among the top
three states receiving crude oil, which is imported into several ports daily.
One of these ports is the Louisiana Offshore Oil Port (LOOP), the nation’s
first and only deep-water oil port.3 The LOOP receives between one and
two million barrels per day and is the single largest point of entry for
waterborne crude oil shipped into the United States.4 
While Louisiana is home to two of the four storage sites that make up
the U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve,5 most of Louisiana’s refined
petroleum products flow out of the state.6 One of the nation’s largest
refined petroleum product pipelines, the 3,100-mile Plantation Pipeline
Network (PPN), begins near Baton Rouge, Louisiana, transports products
through several southern states, and ultimately ends near Washington, 
D.C., servicing several metropolitan areas and airports along the way.7 The
PPN supplies most of the South with motor gasoline, jet fuel, diesel, and
biodiesel.8 The Plantation Pipe Line Company (PPL), operated by Kinder
Morgan,9 holds easements, or written agreements, with landowners that
allow them to operate and maintain the pipelines through the owner’s
private property.10 The process by which Kinder Morgan, a private
Copyright 2019, by SARAH SIMMONS.
1. Where are Liquids Pipelines Located?, PIPELINE 101, https://www.pipeline
101.org/where-are-pipelines-located [https://perma.cc/GEB6-RLJ8] (last visited
July 13, 2019).
2. Louisiana State Energy Profile: Overview, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., 
https://www.eia.gov/state/print.php?sid=LA [https://perma.cc/9ST7-8YRE] (last
updated Feb. 15, 2018).
3. Louisiana State Energy Profile: Petroleum, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.,
https://www.eia.gov/state/print.php?sid=LA [https://perma.cc/LDY8-VLEM] (last 
updated Feb. 15, 2018).
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Kinder Morgan is one of the largest energy infrastructure companies in
North America. It owns an interest in or operate approximately 84,000 miles of
pipelines and 157 terminals and have approximately 11,000 employees. About Us, 
Corporate Profile, KINDER MORGAN, https://www.kindermorgan.com/pages/
about_us [https://perma.cc/7YG7-SM4Y] (last visited July 20, 2019).
10. Products Pipelines: Right of Way, KINDER MORGAN, https://www.kinder
morgan.com/pages/business/products_pipelines/plantation_rightofway.aspx [https:
//perma.cc/6RG3-7EL6] (last visited July 20, 2019).
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3312019] COMMENT
company, and other energy infrastructure companies, garnered these
agreements with private landowners is called expropriation.
Before the Louisiana Supreme Court’s decision in ExxonMobil Pipeline
Co. v. Union Pac. R.R. Co.,11 state law required that an expropriating
authority prove that the expropriation of property was both needed and
necessary.12 This means that a necessary and public purpose warranted the 
expropriation and that the taken land was actually needed to serve that
purpose. As the law now stands, all that the expropriator, or the company
intending to expropriate land, must prove is a public and necessary purpose
for the expropriation by a preponderance of the evidence.13 The necessity of
the land taken for the expropriation itself, both the location and extent, is
within the discretion of the pipeline company. 
Once an expropriation is approved, in order to fight the expropriation,
a landowner must prove either that the expropriation does not serve a
public purpose, that it is not necessary, or that the pipeline company
abused its discretion by acting in bad faith.14 This shifts the responsibility
for ensuring that an expropriating authority acts in accordance with the
law onto the landowner, instead of the pipeline company. That burden shift
is not in line with the legislative intent inherent in the language of
Louisiana Revised Statutes section 19:2(8) and Louisiana Revised Statutes
section 45:254.15 Instead, the burden should be on the pipeline company, 
through a preliminary permitting process, to show three things: (1) a public
and necessary purpose for the expropriation; (2) the proposed property— 
both location and extent—is both necessary and needed; and also that (3)
the addition of a pipeline would not unduly harm Louisiana’s environment
or existing pipeline system.
Part I of this Comment addresses the history, statutory authorization,
and procedure for expropriating property. Part I also addresses the
property owner’s rights and remedies. Part II discusses the prominent
issues in expropriation case law: what constitutes a public and necessary 
purpose; how necessity as to land and location is determined and
regulated; and the shifting burden of proof for both the landowner and the
expropriating authority. Part III analyzes other states’ laws governing
11. ExxonMobil Pipeline Co. v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 35 So. 3d 192, 203 (La.
2010) (Knoll, J., dissenting).
12. See id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. See id. “By the clear and unambiguous language of this statutory law the
property to be expropriated must be both needed and necessary, and the party
upon whom the burden to establish both the need and necessity of the property
should logically be the expropriator.”
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332 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. VIII
expropriation, the requirements they place on expropriating authorities
and common carriers, and the reforms they have made. Finally, Part IV
proposes a framework to better balance expropriations for public use and
the deprivation of property owners’ constitutional right to property in the
future. This Comment suggests a solution similar to Georgia's statutory
framework to determine whether an expropriation, and the intended
property to be taken, serve a public, necessary purpose, without undue
delay, and ensure that landowners' liberty interests at stake are properly
protected.
I. BACKGROUND
In the United States, the right to own, maintain, and control one’s own
private property is a fundamental one.16 Therefore, both federal and state 
constitutional provisions provide the basic framework for the legal
structure relevant to this Comment. The Fifth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution, which is made applicable to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment, provides that “[n]o person shall be deprived of
life, liberty, or property without due process; nor shall private property be
taken or public use without just compensation.”17 The legal confines that
once theoretically protected landowners from unconstitutional takings
have been broadened as the definition of what qualifies as a “public use”
has expanded, allowing pipeline companies more freedom when
expropriating private property.18 
There are two standards generally used by district courts for
determining what qualifies as a public use: the “use by the public” test,
which is a narrower view, and the “public benefit” test, which is more
broad.19 The “use by the public” test defines public use as any legitimate
public purpose or public advantage, such as public ownership or access.20 
“Public benefit” includes things such as redistributing concentrated land
and promoting economic development.21 
16. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
17. See St. Bernard Port, Harbor, & Terminal Dist. v. Violet Dock Port, Inc.,
LLC, 239 So. 3d 243, 250 (La. 2018) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. V).
18. Natalie Jensen, Eminent Domain and Oil Pipelines: A Slippery Path for
Federal Regulation, 29 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 320, 325 (2017).
19. Cavarrio Carter, System Check: Balancing Texas’s Need for Natural 
Resources Exploration with Texas Landowner Rights in Light of Texas Rice Land
Partners v. Denbury Green Pipeline-Texas, 2 LSU J. ENERGY L. & RESOURCES
309, 311 (2014) (citing 2A-7 NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 7:02[2]-[3]).
20. Id.
21. Id.
337577-LSU_EL_8-1.indd  337 1/3/20  7:23 AM
   
 
 
 
 
   
  
  
 
   
  
   
 
   
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
     
  
     
    
   
 
 
 
 
    
 
    
    
      
   
        
    
  
        
 
         
     
3332019] COMMENT
The United States Supreme Court extends great deference to state 
courts and legislatures regarding public use.22 Long ago, the Court rejected
any literal requirement that condemned property be put into use for the
general public, providing that “[i]t is not essential that the entire
community, nor even any considerable portion, . . . directly enjoy or
participate in any improvement in order [for it] to constitute a public
use.”23 Under the current law, “a taking satisfies the constitutional public 
use requirement if it advances a ‘conceivable public purpose,’ regardless
of whether it succeeds in realizing that purpose.”24 
Article 1, Section 4 of the Louisiana Constitution provides that every
person has the right to acquire, own, use, control, and dispose of property
that shall not be taken or damaged except for public purposes and with just
compensation.25 Therefore, any expropriation, or taking of private land for
public use, must be for a public purpose and upon just compensation.26 
Louisiana citizens, through ratifying constitutional provisions, have
indicated their interest in limiting the situations in which private property
can be expropriated, requiring not just a public purpose, but a “public and
necessary purpose.”27 
The Louisiana Constitution defines public purpose similarly to the 
“public use test,” as either a general public right to a definite use of the
property or continuous public ownership of the property dedicated to one
or more of the enumerated uses, one of which is public utilities for the
benefit of the public generally.28 In 2006, after the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Kelo v. City of New London,29 Louisiana amended state
constitutional takings provisions, limiting the definition of public purpose.
This limited definition stated that neither economic development,
enhancement of tax revenue, nor any incidental public benefit shall be
22. 13 POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 79F.03, at 6 (Michael Allan Wolf ed.,
2000).
23. Haw. Hous. Auth. V. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 244 (1984) (citing Rindge 
Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 262 U.S. 700 (1923)).
24. 13 POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 79F.03, at 8 (Michael Allan Wood ed.,
2000) (citing Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 241–42 (1984)).
25. LA. CONST. art. 1. § 4(B)(1).
26. St. Bernard Port, Harbor, & Terminal Dist. v. Violet Dock Port, Inc.,
LLC, 239 So. 3d 243, 250 (La. 2018).
27. See id. at 255–56 (Weimer, J., dissenting) (citing LA. CONST. art. 1, § 4 (B)
(1974)) (emphasis added).
28. LA. CONST. art. 1 § 4 (B)(2)(V).
29. 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
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334 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. VIII
considered when determining whether the taking or damaging of private
property serves a public purpose.30 
A. The Process of Expropriating Private Land in Louisiana 
The term expropriation originally denoted a voluntary surrender of
rights or claims.31 In that sense, it was the opposite of appropriation, which 
denotes selecting, devoting, or setting apart land for a particular purpose.32 
However, over time, the meaning of expropriation has shifted, imported
from its use in foreign jurisprudence. This means that expropriation is no
longer a voluntary surrender, but rather is synonymous with the exercise
of the power of eminent domain.33 Eminent domain is defined as “the
inherent power of a governmental entity to take privately owned property,
especially land, and convert it to public use, subject to reasonable
compensation for the taking.”34 
In Louisiana, the state power to expropriate is extended, through
legislation, to companies who serve a public purpose, including those who
are defined as “common carriers.”35 In order to expropriate property, a
pipeline company must qualify as a common carrier. A common carrier is
defined in this context as “all pipeline entities through which petroleum is
conveyed from one point in the state to another.”36 To register as a common
carrier, a pipeline company must file an application with the Louisiana
Public Service Commission. It must include information about the carrier’s
name, its organizational structure identifying ownership of the pipeline
system, the pipeline system name, the pipeline system map, and the
regulatory contact information.37 This application must also include
information regarding the party responsible for maintaining the carrier’s
30. 13 POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 79F.03, 30 (citing LA. CONST. art. 1 §
4 (B)(3)).
31. Expropriation, LAW DICTIONARY, https://thelawdictionary.org/expropri
ation/ [https://perma.cc/44ZS-N4NJ] (last visited July 13, 2019).
32. Appropriation, LAW DICTIONARY, https://thelawdictionary.org/appropri
ation-of-land/ [https://perma.cc/QD4C-KZ98] (last visited July 13, 2019).
33. Eminent Domain, LAW DICTIONARY, https://thelawdictionary.org/expro
priation/ [https://perma.cc/V9G8-7QVJ] (last visited July 13, 2019).
34. Amanda Buffington Niles, Eminent Domain and Pipelines in Texas: It’s
as Easy as 1, 2, 3 – Common Carriers, Gas Utilities, and Gas Corporations, 16 
TEX.WESLEYANL. REV. 271, 274 (2010) (citing Eminent Domain, BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY (3d pocket ed. 2006)).
35. LA. REV. STAT. § 45:251 (2018).
36. Id. § 45:252.
37. LA. PUB. SERV. COMM’N., GEN. ORDER R-33390, RULES APPLICABLE TO
COMMON CARRIER PETROLEUM PIPELINES (Mar. 9, 2015), § 1.
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3352019] COMMENT
compliance with Commission orders, a statement of rates, rules affecting the
jurisdictional transportation rates or services provided, the effective date of
the tariff, and the type(s) of commodities being transported through the
pipeline.38 Finally, they must pay a $200 registration fee.39 Once a pipeline
company has been registered and approved as a common carrier, they have
the power to expropriate land, either through a settlement with a landowner
or an expropriation proceeding. 
Before filing an expropriation suit, an entity with the authority to
expropriate must attempt, in good faith, to reach a settlement with the
property owner.40 This includes, but is not limited to, providing the owner
of the property with an appraisal of the property to be taken, an offer of
compensation for a specified amount, and a letter detailing the basis on
which the expropriating authority exercises its power, including the
purpose, terms, and conditions of the acquisition.41 If a settlement cannot
be reached or if the owner is unknown, the expropriating authority may 
file a petition to expropriate in the parish where the property is located,
detailing the purposes of the expropriation, describing the necessity of the
property and the proposed improvements, and listing the owner’s name, if
known.42 Lastly, the petition must include a request that the property be 
adjudicated to the expropriating authority and the owner paid just
compensation.43 
At trial, the pipeline company must prove: (1) they are authorized to
expropriate private property; (2) the property will be used for a public
purpose; (3) it is necessary that the property be expropriated; and (4)
demonstrate the amount the pipeline company will pay the landowner,
including the value of the property taken, the decrease—if any—in the
value of the remaining property, and compensation for any other
damages.44
B. Louisiana Landowner’s Rights and Remedies
Some landowners acquiesce to an expropriation in order to receive
compensation for land they may not otherwise be able to sell, especially if
38. Id. at § 3(A).
39. Id. at § 9.
40. LA. REV. STAT. § 19:2.
41. Id. § 19:2.2.
42. Id. § 19:2.1.
43. Id.
44. Gerald F. Slattery, Jr., Pipeline Right of Way Expansion in Louisiana, 6 
LSU J. ENERGY L. & RESOURCES 93, 104 (2017) (citing LA. REV. STAT. § 19:2.2
(2017)).
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336 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. VIII
the land is not fit for residential use or is too close to existing pipelines
pathways. However, if a landowner wishes to fight an expropriation of
their land, must either show: (1) that the entity attempting to expropriate
does not have the authority to do so; (2) the pipeline company did not
engage in good faith pre-suit negotiations; or (3) that the expropriating
authority acted arbitrarily, capriciously, or otherwise in bad faith.45 It is
not required that negotiations be concluded or that the initial offer made
for the property be increased. However, an expropriation suit may be
dismissed as premature if the expropriator has not first, in good faith,
negotiated with and been refused by the landowner.46 
Occasionally, a situation occurs where a pipeline company has already
taken possession of privately-owned property without consent, and in
those cases, landowners may sue to have the company evicted and receive
compensatory damages.47 However, the St. Julien Doctrine, a
jurisprudential rule now codified as Louisiana Revised Statutes section
19:14, is implicated when a landowner observes construction occurring,
allows the construction to continue by verbally or implicitly consenting,
and then later attempts to sue for damages in addition to the property value
because the property was never officially expropriated. The St. Julien
Doctrine provides that an expropriating authority may acquire a servitude
over the land of another without expropriation if the landowner consents 
or acquiesces in the pipeline’s construction48 or other construction
activities conducted on the land by the expropriating authority. 
In St. Julien v. Morgan L. & T.R. Co.,49 the case from which the
doctrine arose, the plaintiff’s father granted a right of way to a railroad
company who began construction on the property and then became
insolvent.50 The defendant then acquired the property and the plaintiff
allowed them to continue the previous construction after becoming the
owner of the land.51 Later, the plaintiff brought suit seeking recognition of
his ownership of the land and requesting rent for the land used.52 The court
held that because the plaintiff permitted the use of his land, he could not
45. Red River Waterway Comm'n v. Fredericks, 566 So. 2d 79, 83 (La.
1990).
46. Dixie Pipeline Co. v. Barry, 227 So. 2d 1, 7 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1969).
47. Crooks v. Placid Ref. Co., 903 So. 2d 1154, 1162 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir.
2005).
48. Sarah Savoia Vance, Property – Expropriation – Demise and Resurrection 
of the St. Julien Doctrine, 51 TUL. L. REV. 375, 375 (1977).
49. 35 La. Ann. 924 (1883).
50. Id. at 925.
51. Id. 
52. Id. at 926.
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3372019] COMMENT
later reclaim it free from the servitude he permitted,53 nor could he treat
the railroad as a tenant or demand damages for trespass.54 The plaintiff’s
remedies were limited to a claim for the value of the land used and
severance damages.55 
Essentially, the St. Julien Doctrine is an exception to statutory
expropriation procedures, allowing the creation of servitudes by estoppel56 
or “unopposed use and occupancy” by a corporation with the power of
expropriation.57 This is because when a landowner consents or acquiesces
to the pipeline construction, it is presumed that he waived his right to
receive just compensation prior to the taking. The landowner is then only
entitled to bring an action to determine whether the taking was for a public
and necessary purpose and to determine just compensation as of the time
of the taking of the property.58 The action proceeds as if the expropriating
authority had filed a petition for expropriation prior to construction as
required.59 However, if the landowner does not give consent and
appropriately contests the construction as it occurs, the St. Julien Doctrine
does not apply, and the landowner may sue for damages from trespass.60 
In Bourgeois v. Louisiana State Gas Corp., the court found that the
plaintiff did not consent to the pipeline construction where he both
verbally and physically attempted to stop the defendants.61 In Bourgeois, 
Louisiana State Gas Corporation and the Department of Transportation
and Development attempted to build a pipeline on a highway right of way
after Bourgeois, the landowner, told them they were on his private
property and tried to block their trucks from entering to begin
construction.62 However, the pipeline was constructed against the
landowner’s wishes and the pipeline company argued that Bourgeois did
not adequately contest the construction.63 The court found that he did not
consent and therefore was owed damages for trespass because the St.
53. Id.
54. Id. 
55. Id.
56. Vance, supra note 48.
57. Lake, Inc. v. La. Power & Light Co., 330 So. 2d 914, 915 (La. 1976).
58. LA. REV. STAT. § 19:14(B) (2018).
59. Id.
60. Bourgeois v. La. State Gas Corp., 836 So. 2d 693 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir.
2003), writ denied, 843 So. 2d 407 (La. 2003).
61. Id. at 696.
62. Id. at 694.
63. Id. 
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338 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. VIII
Julien doctrine did not apply, holding that consent is a prerequisite for the
doctrine.64
Two years after Bourgeois was decided, in Crooks v. Placid Ref. Co.,
the court again focused on consent as a prerequisite to the application of
the St. Julien doctrine, stating that absent consent or acquiescence, proof
of a public benefit would not be enough to defeat an action for trespass.65 
Additionally, the court provided that the public has no interest in a
completed public improvement, which should cause the rights of the
landowner to be disregarded.66 As such, the court in Crooks articulated the 
principle that while expropriating property for a public and necessary
purpose may be beneficial to the public, no public benefit is gained if
private entities are allowed to take a landowner’s property without
sufficient process, highlighting the need for adequate protection for
landowners against unnecessary or improper takings. 
II. THE MAJOR ADJUDICATED ISSUES IN LOUISIANA EXPROPRIATION
CASE LAW
In the struggle to balance the need to protect landowners’ rights and
the interests of pipeline companies in expropriating property, many legal
issues have arisen. The major issues adjudicated in Louisiana
expropriation cases are: what qualifies as a necessary and public purpose,
how need is interpreted and decided, and what constitutes bad faith.
Pursuant to constitutional provisions, the question of whether the purpose
of the expropriation is public and necessary should be left up to a judicial
determination.67 Once the purpose of the expropriation is determined to be
both public and necessary, determining the necessity of the land taken for
the proposed expropriation, meaning both the extent and location, is within
the discretion of the pipeline company. Unless the landowner fighting the
expropriation can show that the pipeline company acted in bad faith in
some way, that discretion is not regulated. This places a large burden on
the landowner fighting expropriation to show bad faith or abuse of
discretion. Otherwise, the pipeline’s company’s determination of
necessity will not be disturbed by the courts. 
64. Id. at 696.
65. Crooks v. Placid Ref. Co., 903 So. 2d 1154, 1158 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir.
2005).
66. Id. (citing MILLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 140).
67. LA. CONST. art. 1 § 4(B)(4).
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3392019] COMMENT
A. Public and Necessary Purpose
In order to expropriate land, a public and necessary purpose is
required. However, Louisiana courts have struggled to define the threshold 
for what qualifies a public and necessary enough purpose to permit
expropriation. In Louisiana Resources Co. v. Greene, the Louisiana Third
Circuit Court of Appeal held that the public does not need to be supplied
gas directly from the pipeline for which expropriation is sought to qualify
as a public purpose;68 rather, by merely placing natural gas into the stream
of commerce, the pipeline is serving a public purpose.69 In Greene, 
appellant landowners argued that Louisiana Resources Company (LRC)
failed to show a necessary and public purpose because the pipeline was 
merely selling gas to gas transmission companies in parishes outside of the
expropriation area.70 The court found that many parish public utilities
received the oil and distributed it to private individuals, in addition to
private industries.71 The court provided that “[s]upplying natural gas to
either private individuals through public utilities or directly to private 
industries is a sufficient public purpose for expropriation, regardless of
how far removed the consumers are from the area of expropriation.”72 The
court’s reasoning seems to allow a much more attenuated connection to
the public than is envisioned in Louisiana’s expropriation provisions, 
which specifically prohibit “any incidental benefit to the public [from
being considered] in determining whether the taking or damaging of
property is for a public purpose.”73 
In ExxonMobil Pipeline Co. v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., Exxon sought
to expropriate land from Union Pacific’s property to place two private,
restricted-access, at-grade crossings over Union Pacific’s tracks in order
to complete a road that would aid in accessing, inspecting, and maintaining
one of Exxon’s valves.74 While federal regulations require bi-yearly
inspections with a mechanical inspection every five years, and Exxon’s
internal regulations require monthly inspections, employees of Exxon
performed the requisite monthly and bi-yearly inspections by merely
68. La. Res. Co. v. Greene, 406 So. 2d 1360, 1364 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir.
1981), writ denied, 412 So. 2d 84 (La. 1982).
69. Id. 
70. Id. at 1363.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 1364.
73. LA. CONST. art 1, § 4 (B)(3).
74. ExxonMobil Pipeline Co. v. Union Pac. R.R., 35 So. 3d 192, 193 (La.
2010).
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walking to the site with hand tools.75 Although the inspection mandated 
every five years would require additional, heavy equipment, the district
court found that Exxon had met this obligation for the last twenty-eight
years, using heavy machinery or equipment equivalent or greater in weight
than what would be needed, without the additional roadway for which they
sued to expropriate land.76 
The appellate court affirmed the district court’s finding that
ExxonMobil failed to show a public purpose because the right of the public
to use the servitude was prohibited by Exxon itself. The court noted that
there must be a general public right to a definite use of the property in 
order to show public purpose.77 Additionally, because the employees were
able to perform the mandatory inspections without the use of the proposed
road, the necessity of the expropriation was not shown.78 However, the
Supreme Court of Louisiana reversed the lower courts, concluding that
complying with federal inspection regulations satisfied the necessity
requirement. The Court allowed Exxon to expropriate land including the
railroad crossing, reasoning that “[a]ny allocation to a use resulting in
advantages to the public at large will suffice to constitute a public
purpose.”79 Therefore, the Court determined Exxon’s expropriation
satisfied both a necessary and public purpose. 
In the past, the burden of proving necessity of the purpose required to
expropriate was much higher. United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Blanchard
exemplifies that higher burden. In that case, the pipeline company
attempting to expropriate had only one committed customer and one
prospective customer.80 There was already a pipeline in the area that was
fully capable of serving everyone, meaning that another pipeline was
unnecessary.81 There were also no witnesses from other possible 
customers showing contracts underway with United Gas or a need for
another pipeline.82 The court found that “it was merely stated that the
purpose of the line was for public use without clarifying or elaborating
upon what the use was, and without in any way showing there would be
75. Id. at 204.
76. Id. at 193.
77. Id. at 195.
78. Id. at 204 (Knoll, J., dissenting).
79. Id. at 199 (quoting Town of Vidalia v. Unopened Succession of Ruffin, 
663 So. 2d 315, 319 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1995)).
80. United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Blanchard, 149 So. 2d 615, 620 (La. Ct. App.
1st Cir. 1963).
81. Id.
82. Id. at 621.
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3412019] COMMENT
any other use for the line than to serve the two plants.”83 Therefore, the
court did not allow United Gas Pipe Line Company to expropriate the
private land because, while the pipeline may have served a public purpose
by transporting oil to customers, it was not necessary since that area was
already being served.84 
B. Necessity as to Extent and Location
While the necessity of a proposed taking is part of the pipeline
company’s burden of proof at trial, it is not a heavy burden, because the
necessity required at trial relates only to the purpose of the expropriation,
not the specific location.85 After a judicial determination of an adequate
public and necessary purpose for an expropriation, Louisiana courts defer
to decisions made by the pipeline company about the extent and location
of the property needed to serve the expropriation’s purpose and will not 
disturb those determinations unless made in bad faith.86 Although the 
amount of land taken must be “reasonably necessary” for the purpose of
the expropriation, it is not required to show actual, immediate, or
impending necessity of the land taken for the expropriation.87 This makes
it extremely difficult for landowners to contest the determinations of
necessity made by pipeline companies.
Faustina Pipe Line Co. v. Levert-St. John, Inc.88 illustrates the
difficulties a landowner faces in trying to challenge the necessity of the
actual land taken. The landowner in Faustina argued that although the
pipeline was to be built for a public and necessary purpose, Faustina did
not show necessity in the pipeline’s projected route. Because of this, the
landowner proposed another option that would not infringe on their land.89 
The court found the testimony from Delancy, who surveyed, mapped, and
selected the proposed route, proved that a different route would have been
overly difficult and would upset too many surrounding areas.90 The court
stated that, included in the necessity test are determinations of location,
83. Id. at 620.
84. Id. 
85. Slattery, supra note 44, at 107 (quoting Coleman v. Chevron Pipeline Co.,
673 So. 2d 291, 296–97 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1996)).
86. Id.
87. Coleman v. Chevron Pipeline Co., 673 So. 2d 291, 297 (La. Ct. App. 4th
Cir. 1996) (citing City of NewOrleans v. Moeglich, 126 So. 675, 677 (La. 1930)).
88. Faustina Pipe Line Co. v. Levert-St. John, Inc., 463 So. 2d 964 (La. Ct.
App. 3d Cir. 1985).
89. Id. at 968.
90. Id.
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depth, and size of the permanent right of way,91 and “[e]vidence that
another route is feasible is not sufficient to show that the grantee’s
selection constitutes bad faith, oppression, or abuse of power.”92 Thus,
while the court does not ordinarily disturb a pipeline company’s
discretionary selection of the amount of land needed and the actual
location of the land expropriated, arguably, if a landowner can show the
pipeline company acted in bad faith when they exercised their discretion,
the court can interfere. 
C. Bad Faith and Abuse of Discretion
In order to fight an expropriation of their land, a landowner must show
that either the purpose of the expropriation is not both public and necessary
or that the pipeline company abused its discretion. A landowner may show
“abuse of discretion by showing the expropriator acted in bad faith,
without adequate determining principles or without reason, or by
demonstrating that the [pipeline company] acted without considering and 
weighing the relevant criteria, including the availability of alternate routes,
cost, environmental factors, long-range area planning, and safety
considerations.”93 Otherwise, once an adequate purpose for the
expropriation is established, absent a showing by the landowner of bad
faith on the part of the pipeline company, determining the extent and
location of the property to be expropriated is within the pipeline
company’s discretion.94 
Justice Knoll, in her dissent in ExxonMobil, notes that “in light of the
derogatory nature of expropriation, the burden should never shift from the
expropriator to the landowner until the expropriator has demonstrated it
acted in good faith, with adequate determining principles, and with
reason.”95 The requirement that a landowner must prove abuse of
discretion by the pipeline company does not reflect a proper balance
between the landowner’s constitutional right to property and a common
carrier pipeline’s statutory authority to expropriate property.96 
91. Id.
92. Id. at 969.
93. Recreation & Park Comm. v. C&S Dev., Inc., 714 So. 2d 706, 707 (La.
1998) (emphasis added).
94. Calcasieu-Cameron Hosp. Serv. Dist. v. Fontenot, 628 So. 2d 75, 78 (La.
Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1993).
95. See ExxonMobil Pipeline Co. v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 35 So. 3d 192, 204
(La. 2010) (Knoll, J., dissenting).
96. Id. at 203.
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3432019] COMMENT
The burden shifting that Justice Knoll discussed is illustrated in
Southwestern Electric Power Co. v. Conger.97 In that case, Southwestern
Electric Power Company (SWEPCO) met the burden of necessity because
there was a gas shortage in the area and they could not convert their factory
to coal, so the only way to supply gas was through an additional pipeline.98 
However, the court maintained the high burden of proving bad faith on the
landowner, stating that “[i]t is not enough for [the landowner] to simply
point out alternate routes to the court, he must show that SWEPCO abused
its discretion, not simply used it.”99 Further, the court held that the
availability of alternate routes is of no concern, provided that “the location
selected fulfills the needs and requirements of the expropriator, meets the
standards prescribed by sound engineering and economic practices, is
neither arbitrarily nor capriciously chosen, and does not constitute an
abuse of the discretionary right of selection.”100 
As previously mentioned, the court in Faustina likewise found that the
existence of another feasible route is not enough to show bad faith on the
part of the pipeline company.101 Additionally, the court made clear that
while the absence of negotiations may equate to bad faith, negotiations do
not have to result in a settlement to be in good faith.102 Because the pipeline
company had several phone calls and meetings with the landowner, made
numerous offers, and exchanged correspondence about the pipeline with
the landowner, the court found evidence of good faith negotiations even
though no settlement was reached.103 
The low threshold for negotiations could allow a pipeline company to
purportedly negotiate in good faith with no actual intention of reaching a
settlement, and if their offer is refused by the landowner, sue for
expropriation. This would force the landowner to either prove that they
acted in bad faith, assuming that the other expropriation requirements are
met, or be required to give up their land. Effectively, the landowner is
97. Southwestern Elec. Power Co. v. Conger, 307 So. 2d 380 (La. Ct. App.
2d Cir. 1975).
98. Id. at 382.
99. Id. (quoting Southwestern Elec. Power Co. v. Conger, 254 So. 2d 98, 100
(La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1971)).
100. Southwestern Elec. Power Co. v. Conger, 307 So. 2d 380, 383 (La. Ct.
App. 2d Cir. 1975) (quoting Cent. La. Elec. Co. v. Brooks, 201 So. 2d 679 (La.
Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1967)).
101. Calcasieu-Cameron Hosp. Serv. Dist. v. Fontenot, 628 So. 2d 75, 78 (La.
Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1993).
102. Id.
103. Faustina Pipe Line Co. v. Levert-St. John, Inc., 463 So. 2d 964, 967 (La.
Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1985).
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somewhat pushed into accepting the pipeline company’s offer or risk
facing costly litigation. Combined with the fact that demonstrating the
existence of another practical, sufficient route is not enough to show bad
faith, the landowner is at a disadvantage if the expropriation reaches trial. 
Additionally, because a pipeline company must only consider the 
criteria relevant to selecting the site to be expropriated, including alternate
routes, safety, and environmental considerations, and costs,104 it would 
seem that even a cursory consideration, without any intent to find an
equitable solution for both parties, would satisfy the court. That cursory
consideration alone would preclude a landowner from demonstrating bad
faith on the part of the pipeline. Furthermore, because suspensive appeals
are not available in expropriation proceedings, a pipeline can continue to
be built while litigation is ongoing.105 As such, a landowner is at an even
greater disadvantage if a proposed expropriation reaches trial because the
burden on them to fight the expropriation is discouragingly high and the
construction on their land can continue while litigation is pending. This
means that while they would be compensated, they may be forced to give 
up the land where a pipeline has already been placed in the interest of
efficiency and curtailing even more damage caused by removal. 
III. THE EXPROPRIATION LAWS AND REFORMS OF OTHER STATES
PROVIDING INSIGHT TO LOUISIANA
Louisiana is not the only state struggling to balance the interests of
private landowners and pipeline companies with expropriation power.
Although each state has different economic and environmental concerns,
looking to states with conditions similar to Louisiana can be helpful to
navigate legal reform in the area of public utility expropriation. 
A. Texas 
Texas is an illustrative example of the struggles that states have faced 
in determining how to classify common carriers and extend the power of
expropriation to them. The Texas Constitution states that “[n]o person’s
property shall be taken, damaged, or destroyed for or applied to public use
without adequate compensation being made, unless by the consent of such
person.”106 In 1915, Texas first recognized pipeline companies as public
service corporations charged with a public use and subject to public
104. Recreation & Park Comm. v. C&S Dev., Inc., 714 So. 2d 706, 707 (La.
1998).
105. LA. REV. STAT. § 19:13 (1975).
106. TEX. CONST. art. 1, § 17.
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3452019] COMMENT
regulation.107 In 1917, the Legislature declared pipeline companies to be
common carriers, and in 1919, they were given the right of eminent
domain.108 
The Texas Natural Resources Code lists seven possible classifications
for the common carrier designation.109 Before Texas Rice Land Partners, 
Ltd. v. Denbury Green Pipeline-Texas, LLC,110 once a pipeline company 
filed with the Texas Railroad Commission (TRC) as a common carrier in
one of the seven listed categories and agreed to be subject to the duties and
obligations mandated by the TRC, it was able to bypass a judicial
determination of common carrier status.111 This is because courts merely
did a cursory check to establish that the pipeline company was a
designated common carrier as declared by the TRC, rather than evaluating
their common carrier status themselves.112 “In sum, once the pipeline 
company subject[ed] itself to the TRC as a common carrier, the pipeline
company ha[d] essentially unreviewable authority to condemn land.”113 
The TRC required pipeline companies to file a T-4 form, which asked
questions such as the following: who the owner and the operator of the
pipeline are, what kind of fluid will be transported, how to classify the
pipeline.114 A spokeswoman for the TRC stated that, as recently as 2010,
the commission has never denied a T-4 permit.115 
When examined all together, the process by which the legislature
determined which entities were delegated eminent domain power,
determinations which were essentially unreviewable by the courts,
combined with the fact that the definitions of the entities given eminent
domain power were incredibly broad and incorporated most oil and gas
companies, it is clear that a landowner attempting to challenge a common
carrier was greatly disadvantaged.116 Texas courts admittedly had adopted
107. Niles, supra note 34, at 277 (citing Humble Pipeline Co. v. State, 2
S.W.2d 1018, 1019 (Tex. App. 1928)).
108. Id. 
109. Id. at 280.
110. Denbury Green Pipeline-Texas, LLC v. Texas Rice Land Partners, LTD.,
510 S.W.3d 909, 914 (Tex. 2017).
111. Niles, supra note 34, at 282.
112. Id. 
113. Id. at 283.
114. Id. at 288 (citing R.R. COMM’N OF TEXAS, APPLICATION OF PERMIT TO
OPERATE A PIPELINE IN TEXAS 2016, https://www.rrc.state.tx.us/media/32492/
2016-fillable-combo-t4-ps8000a-for-liquids.pdf [https://perma.cc/KTL4-CKC5]).
115. Id.
116. Id. at 288.
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a broad view of “public use.”117 Although they had acknowledged that the 
statutes granting eminent domain should be strictly construed in favor of
the landowner, they continually failed to do so.118 
The 2012 decision inDenbury Green was a landmark one, wherein the
Texas Supreme Court ruled that more was required of a pipeline company
to prove common carrier status. That decision was a reaction to the “rubber
stamp policy of the TRC, which approved all pipelines without a thorough
review to ensure they fit within the state’s definition of common carrier.119 
Before the ruling in Denbury Green, in order to receive a common carrier
permit, the applicant need only place an “x” in a box indicating it will
operate as a common carrier and agree to subject itself to TRC
regulations.120 Denbury Green reported itself as a common carrier, and
without investigation or adversarial testing, obtained a permit within a few 
days.121 
In Denbury Green, the court held that pipeline owners do not obtain
the right to condemn private property merely by checking the correct
boxes on a T-4 application filed with the TRC and that a landowner can
challenge in court whether the proposed pipeline truly serves the public.122 
Additionally, the court stated that “[p]rivate property cannot be imperiled
with such nonchalance, via an irrefutable presumption created by checking
a certain box on a one-page government form,123 concluding that the Texas
Constitution demands far more.”124 
The court declared that a pipeline must serve the public and cannot be
built only for the builder’s exclusive use.125 Ultimately, in order for a
pipeline company to qualify as a common carrier, “a reasonable
117. Id. at 278 (citing Coastal States Gas Producing Co. v. Pate, 158 Tex. 171,
174, 309 S.W.2d 828, 833 (Tex. 1958)).
118. Id.
119. Jensen, supra note 18, at 333 (quoting Thomas J. Forestier, Jamie 
Lavergne Bryan, & Larence M. “Trey” Lansford III, Feature: What’s in the
Pipeline? 79 TEX. B.J. 218, 219 (2016)).
120. Nicholas Laurent & Christopher Oddo, Pipe(line) Dreams Post Denbury-
Green, 48 ST. MARY’S L.J. 699, 701 (2017).
121. Id. 
122. Carter, supra note 19, at 323(citing Texas Rice Land Partners, Ltd. v.
Denbury Green Pipeline-Texas, LLC, 363 S.W.2d 192, 195, reh’g denied, 381
S.W.3d 465 (Tex. 2012)).
123. The T-4 form has since been revised and is now three pages. 
124. Laurent & Oddo, supra note 120 (quoting TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. §
111.002(6)).
125. Carter, supra note 19, at 324 (2014) (citing Texas Rice Land Partners,
Ltd. v. Denbury Green Pipeline-Texas, LLC, 363 S.W.2d 192, 200, reh’g denied, 
381 S.W.3d 465 (Tex. 2012)).
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3472019] COMMENT
probability must exist that [their] pipeline will at some point after
construction serve the public by transporting gas for one or more
customers who will either retain ownership of their gas or sell it to parties
other than the carrier.”126 
This “reasonable probability” standard, while clearer, is still
speculative because it considers even possible future service to the public
and may be overinclusive due to its broad language. Although it gives the
landowners an important new power, the ability to challenge the decisions
of the TRC,127 there is still a heavy burden on a landowner to show that a 
company never intends to operate the pipeline they are expropriating land
for as a public pipeline if they are going to overcome the post-Denbury
requirement of public service. The landowners in Denbury Green were 
able to do so because Denbury Green published on their website that they
intended their pipeline to function privately, never publicly, despite
registering as common carriers.128 In most cases, a pipeline company
would not do so.
B. Arkansas
Similar to Texas and Louisiana, the common carrier requirements in
Arkansas are very broad and include most pipeline companies, even if they
are private. In addition, Arkansas case law illustrates the struggle to
determine a sufficient public purpose, a struggle that Louisiana also faces.
Arkansas law provides that all pipeline companies operating in the state,
except those operated for conveying natural gas for public utility service,
are declared common carriers and are given the right of eminent domain
by virtue of that declaration.129 Arkansas law provides a property owner’s
“bill of rights,” which contains provisions such as the following: a
property owner is entitled to receive just compensation; private property
may only be taken for public use; private property may only be taken by
an entity authorized to use the power of eminent domain; a property owner
has the right to receive reasonable notice of an entity’s interest in taking
the owner’s private property; an entity shall make a written good faith
offer before initiating a condemnation proceeding; and a property owner
has the right to hire an attorney to represent them and negotiate with the
entity on their behalf; among other provisions.130 
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Denbury Green Pipeline-Texas, LLC v. Texas Rice Land Partners, Ltd.,
510 S.W.3d 909, 914 (Tex. 2016).
129. ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-15-101 (2018).
130. Id. § 18-15-103.
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If the entity exercising eminent domain cannot reach an agreement
with a landowner, they may file a petition in the circuit court of the county
where the property is located.131 The purpose of the petition is to have the 
property and the damages for the right-of-way assessed, giving the
property owner at least ten days’ notice in writing of the time and place
where the petition will be heard.132 When the court has assessed the
damages for the right-of-way, the entity must pay the damages within
thirty days of the judgment. After payment, the entity may enter upon, use,
and have the right-of-way over the lands forever.133 
Although the Arkansas Constitution provides that private property
shall not be taken, damaged, or appropriated for public use without just
compensation,134 the issue of defining public use has plagued Arkansas 
federal courts.135 Arkansas courts have said that neither a common
carrier’s status as a private company, nor a lack of users who could utilize
the taking are controlling factors in the assessment of a public purpose.136 
Instead, because a common carrier is required to serve the public, an
entity’s classification as a common carrier ensures the public has a right
to use, categorizing the use as public.137 This circular logic makes it
extremely difficult for a landowner to challenge the public purpose of a
taking by a common carrier. 
In Linder v. Arkansas Midstream Gas Servs. Corp, Midstream
unsuccessfully attempted to negotiate with the Linders in order to take a 
right-of-way for a gas gathering pipeline.138 Midstream filed suit and was
granted a right of way.139 The Linders challenged Midstream’s common
carrier status, arguing that the taking was for a private, rather than public,
use.140 The Court held that “it makes no difference that only ‘a collection
of a few individuals’ will be able to use the pipeline because a taking’s
status as public or private is determined by the extent of the public’s right
131. Id. § 18-15-1202.
132. Id.
133. Id. § 18-15-1205.
134. ARK. CONST. art. II, § 22.
135. Malcolm N. Means, Private Pipeline, Public Use?: Linder v. Arkansas
Midstream Gas Services Corp., Smith v. Arkansas Midstream Gas Services Corp.,
and Arkansas’s Eminent Domain Jurisprudence, 64 ARK. L. REV. 809, 811 (2011).
136. Id. at 839.
137. Id. 
138. Id. at 812–13.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 813.
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3492019] COMMENT
to use it, not the extent to which that right is exercised.”141 If members of
the public have the right to use the right-of-way, it is subject to
condemnation, whether the public actually makes use of it.142 
Likewise, in Smith v. Arkansas Midstream Gas Servs. Corp.,143 
Midstream failed to negotiate an agreement with the Smiths and
subsequently filed suit to expropriate their land.144 Similar to Linder, the
Smiths argued that Midstream did not have the authority to exercise eminent
domain because they were seeking to acquire the property for private rather
than public use.145 The Court held that Midstream’s pipeline was available 
to multiple natural gas producers, and their status as a common carrier meant
the public would have an equal right to use the pipeline.146 
Arkansas courts draw a distinction between takings by common
carriers and takings by other entities and reason that because common
carriers are required to give access to the public any exercise of eminent
domain by those entities is considered public.147 Thus, “[a] landowner will
be unlikely to succeed in attacking a company’s status as a common
carrier, since both Midstream cases ruled that common carrier status can
exist even if any public use is speculative or theoretical.”148 As such, if all
pipelines are declared common carriers and all takings by common carriers
are presumed to serve a public purpose, landowners in Arkansas are
greatly disadvantaged in expropriation proceedings.
C. Georgia
The Georgia Legislature first gave pipeline companies the power of
eminent domain in 1943 to provide for the transport of oil and gas during
wartime.149 Pipeline companies continued to enjoy a largely “unfettered” 
power of eminent domain until the law was reformed in 1995.150 Georgia
141. Linder v. Arkansas Midstream Gas Servs. Corp., 362 S.W.3d 889, 897
(Ark. 2010).
142. Id.
143. Smith v. Arkansas Midstream Gas Servs. Corp., 377 S.W.3d 199 (Ark.
2010).
144. Means, supra note 135, at 815.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 816 (citing Smith v. Ark. Midstream Gas Servs. Corp., 377 S.W.3d
199 (Ark. 2010)).
147. Id. at 828.
148. Id. at 833.
149. Julie A. Beberman, Exercise of Power of Eminent Domain for Special 
Purposes: Provide Restrictions on Use of Eminent Domain Power by Petroleum
Pipeline Companies, 12 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 184, 185 (1995).
150. Id.
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law provides that “any corporation engaged in constructing, running, or
operating pipelines in this state as a common carrier in interstate or
intrastate commerce for the transportation of petroleum and petroleum
products shall have the right of eminent domain.”151 Any property or
interest condemned pursuant to that section is deemed to have been
condemned for a public purpose.152 Before reforming the law in 1995, all
pipeline companies were deemed common carriers and therefore all land
seized by pipeline companies was presumed to be for a public purpose.153 
The process of determining public purpose involved no public
involvement, nor any federal or state oversight.154 
In 1994, the General Assembly enacted a one-year moratorium on the
exercise of eminent domain and established a study committee made up of
thirteen members to propose new legislation based on a review of the
effects of petroleum pipelines and the legal mechanisms which can be used
to restrict the siting of pipelines to protect natural resources.155 The 
committee communicated with the public about their concerns, learned 
about pipeline operations, safety procedures, and the effect of pipelines on
Georgia’s economy.156 The committee also assessed the potential
environmental impacts of a pipeline and studied other states and their
procedures for eminent domain.157 The committee found that six states did
not grant eminent domain powers to common carriers at all.158 Fifteen
states, including Louisiana, required some type of approval by state
agencies.159 Two states, including Arkansas, required public comment on
the proposed pipeline route.160 The remaining states, including Texas and
Alabama, had laws resembling Georgia’s then existing laws.161 
The committee then proposed new legislation that landowners,
pipeline companies, regulatory agencies, and environmental groups all
supported. The bill passed unopposed.162 Under the new legislation, in 
order to exercise the power of eminent domain, a pipeline company must
151. Id. at 186 (quoting 1981 Ga. Laws 789 (formerly found at O.G.C.A. § 22-
3-80(a) (1982)).
152. Id.
153. Id. at 186.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 188–89.
156. Id. at 189–90.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 190.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 191.
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3512019] COMMENT
notify a landowner before any expropriation action can be taken.163 This
notice must include specific language in order to educate landowners
about the eminent domain process, including their rights and
responsibilities. After notifying a landowner, but before exercising
eminent domain, a pipeline company must obtain a “certificate of public
convenience” from the Georgia Department of Transportation (DOT) who
must conduct a public hearing and approve or deny the permit within
ninety days; otherwise, the certificate is legally approved.164 Additionally,
the pipeline company must secure a permit from the Department of Natural
Resources (DNR), which is again time limited and must be approved or
denied within 120 days of the notification of the landowner, otherwise it
is automatically approved.165 If the DNR permit decision is appealed, the
judge must issue a decision within 120 days of the filing of the petition.166 
The 1995 statute institutes more oversight by the Department of
Transportation and the Department of Natural Resources, includes the
general public in decision making, and fairly compensates the landowner
for property acquired and any other property “unreasonably impacted,” all
while avoiding undue delays on pipeline companies.167 The legislation 
grants restricted and conditional rights to pipeline companies to exercise
the power of eminent domain to acquire property for the construction,
reconstruction, operation, and maintenance of new pipelines operating as
common carriers.168 However, it does not restrict or limit the exercise of
eminent domain when the property is needed to maintain existing pipelines
or relocate pipelines due to the “exercise of legal rights of a third party.”169 
In 2017, the Georgia General Assembly revised their eminent domain
laws again, adding to the provisions put in place by the 1995 reform. After
July 1, 2017, any construction of a new pipeline or an extension must have
a permit from the Environmental Protection Division (EPD) of the
Department of Natural Resources.170 This permit is required regardless of
whether the pipeline company intends to exercise eminent domain.171 In
addition, an application to the EPD must include proof of notice to all
landowners whose property is within 1,000 feet of the route of the
163. Id. at 192.
164. Id. at 193.
165. Id. at 194–95.
166. Id. at 195.
167. Id. at 194–95.
168. Id. at 191.
169. Id. at 191–92.
170. GA. CODE ANN. § 22-3-82 (2018).
171. Id. § 12-17-2.
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proposed pipeline.172 In making the decision as to whether a permit will be 
granted, the director of the EPD will consider the following: any undue
hazards to the environment and natural resources of the state; public
comment; alternative routes for the proposed pipeline, and other factors
that the director finds reasonable.173 
Consistent with the 1995 reform, the 2017 amendment reaffirms that
a pipeline company must also apply for a certificate of public convenience
and necessity from the commissioner of transportation, unless they do not
intend to use the power of eminent domain to acquire property or are
exercising the power of eminent domain to perform maintenance on an
already existing pipeline.174 An application for a certificate of public
convenience must include a description of the public convenience and
necessity that support the proposed location of the route of the new
pipeline.175 
In deciding whether to grant the certificate of public convenience, the
commissioner will consider many factors;176 however, the applicant bears 
the burden of proving the necessity of the proposed pipeline.177 The new
legislation also enables a landowner to appeal the issuance of a permit by
the Department of Transportation where previously only appeals based on
the denial of a permit, presumably from pipeline companies, was
allowed.178 
D. Comparing Louisiana to Texas, Arkansas, and Georgia 
Comparatively, Louisiana’s current law falls somewhere between
Georgia and Texas. While Louisiana requires a judicial finding of both
necessity and public purpose,179 Texas requires no such showing of
172. Id. § 12-17-3.
173. Id. § 12-17-4.
174. Id. § 22-3-82.
175. Id. § 22-3-83.
176. Factors such as: whether existing pipelines are adequate to meet the
reasonable public needs; the volume of demand for petroleum and whether the
anticipated future demand can support the already existing pipeline systems as 
well as the pipeline proposed by the applicant; the adequacy of the supply of
petroleum to serve the public; and any other factors that the commissioner may
find reasonable. Id. § 22-3-83.
177. Id.
178. Mary Landers, Georgia Lawmakers Pass Compromise Bill, SAVANNAH 
NOW (Mar. 31, 2017, 8:49 PM), https://www.savannahnow.com/news/2017-03-31
/georgia-lawmakers-pass-compromise-pipeline-bill [https://perma.cc/7L5B-AQL7].
179. LA. CONST. art. 1 § 4(B)(4).
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3532019] COMMENT
necessity.180 Additionally, while both Louisiana and Texas require
pipeline companies to register as common carriers, unlike Arkansas, the
process to qualify as a common carrier in Louisiana is not straightforward.
Finally, the presumption that a proposed expropriation by a common
carrier automatically serves a necessary and public purpose by virtue of
the pipeline company’s common carrier status, adhered to explicitly in 
Arkansas and implicitly in both Louisiana and Texas, is almost completely
contradicted by Georgia’s required oversight from the Department of
Transportation, the Department of Natural Resources, and the inclusion of
the community in public hearings. As such, considering similar
modifications to the ones applied by Georgia's legislature in 1995 and
2017 could be beneficial for both Louisiana’s pipeline companies and
private landowners.
IV. THE APPLICATION OF GEORGIA’S STATUTORY EMINENT DOMAIN 
FRAMEWORK TO LOUISIANA LAW
An application of Georgia’s procedural reforms to Louisiana’s already
existing statutory guidelines would enhance the structure already in place,
encouraging clarity in the expropriation process and better informing
landowners of their rights and the recourse available to them. Additionally,
this procedural application would aid in protecting Louisiana’s natural
resources and already existing pipeline and distribution systems, while not
unfairly increasing the time and requirements already involved in
expropriation proceedings on pipeline companies.
Louisiana already requires pipeline companies to register with the 
Louisiana Public Service Commission in order to be approved as common
carriers. Although this registration process involves some level of
regulatory oversight, the registration approval criteria—as well as 
statistics on application denial rates—is unavailable to the public.
Additionally, similar to the framework in place in Georgia, Louisiana law
already requires pipeline companies to engage in good faith negotiations
with a landowner and to provide notice of their intent to expropriate prior
to instituting an expropriation suit. 
Although these provisions are useful and require more than some of
our neighboring states, there are many areas where Louisiana’s
expropriation law could benefit from reform. The two-step permitting
process required in Georgia would be incredibly beneficial to Louisiana’s
landowners. It would also benefit the pipeline and distribution
infrastructure already in place, because if an area is already adequately
180. TEX. CONST. art. 1 § 17.
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serviced or would be harmfully impacted, a pipeline company likely could
not obtain the required permits. 
Requiring pipeline companies to obtain a permit from the Louisiana
Department of Natural Resources would not only allow for regulatory
oversight regarding the effects of the proposed pipeline on Louisiana’s
natural resources and environment but it would also facilitate public input
as to what concerns are pertinent to Louisiana citizens as a whole through 
the public hearings required in the permitting process. Additionally,
mandating notice to landowners whose property falls within 1,000 feet of
the proposed pipeline route, rather than solely the owner of the land subject
to the taking, would broaden the scope of public involvement in the permit
granting process. Greater public input would allow the director of the DNR
to hear from landowners who are affected by the pipeline and may
otherwise have not been allowed involvement in the process. Although
1,000 feet may seem like an arbitrary figure,181 it is logical in the sense
that an oil leak or major maintenance issue will likely affect more than just
the owner of the land where the pipeline exists. Although involving the
public through hearings and sufficient notice does not always result in a
fairer process, it certainly allows for more clarity and encourages both
pipeline companies and regulatory agencies to work to ensure that a
landowner’s constitutional right to property is not improperly divested.
Instituting a requirement of a Certificate of Public Convenience and
Necessity from the Louisiana Department of Transportation and
Development (DOTD) would be an immense improvement to the current
regulatory system implemented by the Louisiana Public Service 
Commission. If a pipeline company registered as a common carrier intends
to expropriate private property in Louisiana, requiring them to show public
purpose and necessity to obtain a certificate using many of the same 
factors used in Georgia182 would significantly reduce the burden on the
landowner to fight an expropriation. If the pipeline company cannot carry
the burden of proving necessity in order to obtain a permit from the
DOTD, then the landowner will likely never face the proposed
expropriation in the first place. 
As it stands now, the language of Article 1 Section 4 of the Louisiana
Constitution states that the question of a public and necessary purpose
181. One thousand feet is the requirement for notice to surrounding
landowners in Georgia pursuant to Ga. Code Ann. § 12-17-3.
182. See Georgia factors such as: whether existing pipelines are adequate to
meet the reasonable public needs; the volume of demand for petroleum and
whether the anticipated future demand can support the already existing pipeline
systems as well as the pipeline proposed by the applicant; and the adequacy of the 
supply of petroleum to serve the public.
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3552019] COMMENT
shall be a judicial one.183 Introducing the requirement of a Certificate of
Public Convenience and Necessity from the Department of Transportation
and Development would initially delegate that power to a state agency.
However, because the permitting and certification process is appealable if
denied and a pipeline company must have judicial approval to expropriate,
the permits would just be preliminary determinations. Further, the court
would maintain final control over evaluating the purpose for the
expropriation itself. This would allow an unbiased third party to weigh all
of the factors at play from the perspective of both the pipeline company
and the landowner and make the best decision on necessity according to
the facts at hand.184 Once the pipeline company obtained the required 
documentation, along with the requirements already in place, such as
notice to the landowner and good faith negotiations, they could sue to
expropriate the land and the court could make the final determination as
to whether the purpose of the expropriation is, in fact, both public and
necessary. 
Both the Department of Transportation and Development and the
Department of Natural Resources already have divisions in place that
could evaluate applications and administer the permits required. The
DOTD has a “right-of-way permits” office, which manages permits for
construction of other utilities such as sewage, waterworks, and fiber optics
services.185 The Department of Natural Resources has a pipeline division 
that oversees with pipeline safety and operations.186 
Additionally, the Louisiana Public Service Commission (LPSC),
which processes common carrier permits, already administers Certificates
of Public Convenience and Necessity to electric transmission facilities
183. LA. CONST. art. 1, § 4 (B)(4).
184. A pipeline operations program already exists as a subdivision of the
pipeline division of the department of natural resources. The program regulates the
construction, acquisition, abandonment, and interconnection of pipelines. See State
of Louisiana Department of Natural Resources, Office of Conservation, PIPELINE 
OPERATIONS http://www.dnr.louisiana.gov/index.cfm/page/150 [https://perma.cc/
JR8R-EN8D] (last visited July 13, 2019).
185. Right-of-Way Permits, LA. DEP’T OF TRANSP. & DEV., 
http://wwwsp.dotd.la.gov/Inside_LaDOTD/Divisions/Engineering/Road_Design 
/Right-of-Way/Pages/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/L2VN-KKTN] (last visited
July 13, 2019).
186. Office of Conservation Pipeline Division, LA. DEP’T. OF NAT. RESOURCES, 
http://wwwsp.dotd.la.gov/Inside_LaDOTD/Divisions/Engineering/Road_Design/
Right-of-Way/Pages/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/9E57-8DKB] (last visited July
13, 2019).
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prior to an expropriation.187 The LPSCmandates these certificates because
unless a landowner challenges an expropriation, a judicial inquiry into
whether an electric utility actually complied with statutory requirements
is not permitted.188 
As cited in the LPSC General Order authorizing these certificates,
both Arkansas and Texas require a Certificate of Public Convenience for
electric transmission facilities with Arkansas also requiring a Certificate
of Environmental Compatibility.189 If these certification processes already
occur for electric transmission facilities, it would seem that they would be
successful in addressing the similar concerns of landowners in the field of
pipeline expropriation. Furthermore, the benefits of incorporating these
permits for pipeline companies, as Georgia has done, would far outweigh 
the bureaucratic burden of doing so, as the departments needed to evaluate
the permits already exist and do so for other utilities. 
Implementing these reforms would strike a better balance between a
landowner’s constitutional property rights and a pipeline company’s 
interest in expropriating land. If, as in Georgia, the permit and certificate
were required to be approved or denied within 90 to 120 days or were 
otherwise automatically issued,190 the pipeline company intending to
expropriate land would not be unduly burdened. In fact, the pipeline
company is already statutorily required to meet these prerequisites before
an expropriation could take place. Instead, the permit and certification
process would ensure that the burden would be on the pipeline company
to affirmatively prove that they meet all of the required criteria, rather than
placing the burden on the landowner to show that they do not once the
expropriation process has already begun. 
CONCLUSION
It is a well-established legal principle that because expropriation
derogates from the right of individuals to own property, the law governing
expropriation proceedings should be strictly construed against the
187. In re: Determination As To Whether The Commission Should Issue A
General Order Asserting Jurisdiction Over The Certification of Utility
Transmission Projects and the Determination of Whether Those Projects Are In The
Public Interest, La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n. Gen. Order R-26018 (Sept. 18, 2013).
188. Id. § V, 5.
189. Id. § VI, 6–7.
190. Beberman, supra note 149, at 193.
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expropriating authority.191 However, this oft referenced principle is not
always upheld in practice. Introducing more oversight into the
expropriation process already adhered to in Louisiana would strike the
proper balance between the state’s economic interest in oil and gas while
protecting the liberty interests at stake for landowners. Incorporating a 
two-step permit process would better preserve Louisiana’s environment
and natural resources, protect the already existing pipeline and distribution
infrastructure, and encourage and facilitate pipeline expansion and growth
where needed. These reforms could be implemented without placing an
undue burden on pipeline companies or putting a landowner at a
disadvantage in an expropriation suit. 
Sarah A. Simmons 
191. See St. Bernard Port, Harbor, & Terminal Dist. v. Violet Dock Port, Inc.,
LLC., 239 So. 3d 243, 265 (La. 2018), (Guidry, J., dissenting) (quoting State v.
Estate of Davis, 572 So. 2d 39, 42 (La. 1990).
 J.D./D.C.L. candidate 2020, Paul M. Hebert Law Center, Louisiana State 
University. The author extends her gratitude to Professor Greg Smith for his
guidance, encouragement, and time poured into this Comment. Additionally, the
author expresses great thanks to the Journal of Energy Law and Resources
Volume VII and VIII Editorial Boards for their thoughtful edits and contributions
during the production process.
